Bernardo de Moura
Bernardo de Moura

Bernardo
de Moura

Ph.D. Candidate in Economics
University of Pennsylvania

bdemoura@sas.upenn.edu

I am an economist specializing in industrial organization. I study how financial institutions and market rules affect competition and welfare. My research combines administrative data and models of competition, with applications to business-to-business finance and pension markets.

I am on the 2026–2027 economics job market.

Research statement

Job Market Paper

Finance and Competition in B2B Markets: The Role of Factoring

with Eliana Sena (UPenn)

How does access to factoring change competition in business-to-business markets? We study how cheaper financing affects prices, output, and the allocation of production across suppliers.

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Abstract

In business-to-business markets, buyers often pay months after delivery, forcing sellers to finance their clients at potentially high borrowing rates. Factoring -- the sale of unpaid invoices to a financial intermediary -- gives suppliers cash today instead of waiting. We study its welfare and distributional effects across market participants. We develop a model of B2B markets in which sellers differ in material costs and loan rates. Sellers with high loan rates incur high costs from payment delays; factoring reduces these costs. Buyers differ in their preferences over suppliers and choose whichever supplier gives them the highest value net of price. We estimate the model using data from a factoring company. Comparing equilibria with and without factoring, we find that total welfare remains nearly unchanged. On the one hand, the reduction in financial costs leads to lower prices and welfare gains from output expansion. On the other hand, factoring reallocates production towards less efficient suppliers, generating losses from misallocation. These losses arise because reallocation raises production costs by more than it raises buyer value. Finally, in terms of distributional effects, lower interest payments reduce financial companies' revenues and benefit suppliers, who pass some of these gains to buyers through lower prices.

Working Papers

Can Auctions Promote Competition in Regulated Pension Fund Markets? Evidence from Chile

with Keunsang Song (UPenn)

We study procurement auctions that assign new pension affiliates to the lowest-fee provider. Auctions encourage entry, but restricting consumers’ provider choices offsets much of the benefit.

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Abstract

Private pension markets often feature high concentration and high markups, reinforced by consumer inertia. We study the role of procurement auctions in promoting competition, focusing on Chile’s auction design that assigns new consumers to the winner. Using data from Chile’s Superintendencia de Pensiones, we develop and estimate a structural model of consumers’ provider choices and dynamic competition among pension fund administrators. Consumers exhibit inertia in their provider choices. Pension fund administrators bid before nonwinners set fees, and entry occurs endogenously through auction wins. We find that auctions benefit consumers primarily by facilitating entry, but restricting new consumers’ provider choices largely offsets these gains, leaving a net welfare gain of $5.19 per person per month relative to a market without auctions. Expanding the auction award to include existing consumers does not necessarily strengthen the entry benefit: more aggressive incumbent bidding delays entry and contributes to a net welfare loss of $35 per person per month relative to the baseline auction.

Work in Progress

Factoring and the Transmission of Monetary Policy

with Agustín Díaz and Ramiro de Elejalde (Central Bank of Chile)

We study whether factoring mitigates or amplifies the contraction in bank credit following a monetary tightening, using transaction-level bank-loan and invoice data from Chile.

Abstract

We document that factoring—the sale of invoices for immediate cash—is an important source of short-term financing for Chilean firms, especially small ones. Whether factoring mitigates or amplifies the contraction in bank credit that follows a monetary tightening is an open question for policymakers. We study it by estimating local projections of the prices and quantities of bank credit and factoring on monetary policy surprises. We use two transaction-level administrative datasets for 2016–2024: bank loan originations from the Financial Market Commission (CMF), Chile’s financial regulator, which report the interest rate, amount, and maturity of each new loan, and assigned invoices from the Internal Revenue Service (SII), which report the seller, the buyer, and the assignee of each invoice. Because small and large firms differ in their access to bank credit and their use of factoring, we expect their responses to differ, and we estimate the local projections separately by firm size.

The Equilibrium Effects of Voluntary Delayed Retirement: Optimality and Adverse Selection

with Gaston Illanes (Northwestern), Ursula Schwarzhaupt (SUPN), and Benjamin Vatter (MIT Sloan)

We study financial incentives for voluntary delayed retirement using Chile’s bono por hijo reform. The project examines how selection into delayed retirement affects annuity offers, retirement incentives, and the fiscal cost of encouraging later retirement.

Abstract

Expanding the retirement age has become a major political challenge worldwide. An aging population and declining birth rates have greatly burdened national budgets and decreased labor productivity. As unilaterally increasing the retirement age has faced enormous political pushback, countries are evaluating voluntary delayed retirement. Using a natural experiment in Chile that paid some women to postpone their retirement, we evaluate the takeup of the policy and its consequences on retirees. We use the findings to evaluate the equilibrium effects of voluntary delayed retirement policies on annuitization markets. Crucially, under a voluntary regime, healthier workers delay their retirement more, changing risk selection in annuitization markets. Increased longevity risk among those who delay reduces their annuity offers, pushing against delay incentives and increasing the fiscal cost associated with achieving a target average retirement age. Adverse selection into voluntary takeup can undo the benefits of the policy if not properly implemented. We study the optimal voluntary policy and its welfare and fiscal consequences.